The Times | December 28, 1935

The Times |  December 28, 1935

The Times | December 28, 1935

M. Laval Hard Pressed FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT PARIS, DEC. 27 The debate on the policy followed by M. Laval in connexion with the Italo- Abyssinian war began in the Chamber of Deputies this afternoon. The atmosphere inside and outside the Chamber was one of unusual excitement. Not only were the galleries of the Chamber crowded to suffocation, but the neighbouring streets were encumbered with motor-cars and filled with groups of people whom the police kept moving with some difficulty. Police cordons were thrown across the principal approaches as the tide of excite- ment rose. It was known from the beginning that the debate would not finish to-day, but would be adjourned this evening until to-morrow. When the interpellations are over, then M. Laval will reply for the Government; and it is expected that the final vote of confidence will be taken in the afternoon. In his opening statement to the Chamber M. Laval took the line which was expected of him, pointing out that peace would have to be made some day, asserting his scrupulous conformity in action with the decisions of the League (which is undoubted), and pleading the present incompleteness of the collective system. He suffered frequent inter- ruption, but not enough to suggest that the balance of opinion in the Chamber definitely condemned his methods. M. LAVAL’S SPEECH M. Laval said:- It was at my request that the Chamber decided to open to-day this debate on foreign policy. Ten days ago I explained to you the circum- stances in which the French Government, anxious to bring the Italo-Abyssinian conflict to an early end, thought it right to seek, with the British Government, the conditions of an agreed settle- ment. I have said how this action was inspired by the encouragement received by the two Governments. I have reminded you that it was in conformity with the principles and the spirit of the League Covenant. I have also pointed out that when we had completed our mission and had reached the extreme limit of our effort it remained only for us to submit it to the appre- ciation of the two Governtnents directly con- cerned and to thc decision of the League of Nations. Since then grave events have occurred. Sir Samuel Hoare resigned and the British Govern- nicnt considered as ” dead,” according to their own expression, the Paris proposals which were drawn up with Sir Samuel Hoare. The Abyssinian Government were shocked at the share of sacri- ficc which they would have had to accept. The Italian Government did not bring to the examination of our suggestions the diligence and the comprehension which we had the right to expect. I may add that a certain speech [Signor Mussolini’s speech at Pontinia] did not make our task any easier. Thesc events, which. I regret, did not improve tbe situation. They raised grave problems on which it is my duty to explain myself. The essential question before us is to know whether the poticy I have pursued is in con- formity or not with the interests of my country. That is the only question which has to be examined by the French Chamber. I do. not regret the effort I have made. Some day we shall have to re-establish peace. The question is whether I have broken the engagements which France has contracted towards the League and whether I have compromised our security for thc present and for the future. RESPECT FOR COVENANT It is not only by words but by acts that I have shown our respect for the Covenant. At no time, either at Geneva or elsewhere, have I failed to honour our engagements. As the represenlta- tive of a great and free country I have discussed with other members of the League the methods which should be followed to punish aggression, and I have never put obstacles in the way of any of the measures which have been proposed. All those measures, however painful they might be, have found loyal and strict application among us. In execution of paragraph 3 of Article XVr. of the Covenant I have not hesitated to make on behalf of France and towards Great Britain the undertaking to go to her assistance at sea, on land, and in the air if she were attacked by Italy wlhile applying sanctions. In order to dispel any nlisunderstanding which may remain on this subject in international opinion, I now publicly renew the declaration which I then made to the British Ambassador and have since confirmed in Paris to Sir Samuel Hoare himself. In this I feet that I have assumed heavy responsibilities. They are the inevitable consequences of the Covenant. They imposed upon me the duty of trying by every means to relax the tension between Great Britain and Italy. Why should I not confess my fear, my obsession, with the possibility of an incident such as we have seen so often in history, which might drag our country into a war that I have done everything to avoid ? The more severe wvere the obligations to which the Covenant bound us, the more I felt it my duty to neglect nothing to find a peaceful solution. That is the explanation of my patient effort to obtiin the early end of a conflict which might spread to us. It was under the influence of this preoccupation that Sir Samuel Hoare and I examined the question of an embargo on oil. Tlie danger then became clear to us. In the Hotise of Commons Sir Samuel Hoare expressed himself as follows:-” Precisely on account of the oil sanction, and supposing that non-member States took their full share in it, the situation became immediately more dangerous from the point of view of Italian resistance. From all sides we received informa- tion which no responsible Government could have disregarded and from which it appeared that Italy would consider the embargo on oil as a military sanction or an act which implied war against Italy.” “OUR COMMON WORK” With Sir Samuel Hoare I searched for the best mcans of defending the intercsts of our two countries, while protecting peace, and within the framework of international institutions. Our proposals, which had been judged excessive, seemed reasonable to us. Moreover they were not intangible. Sir Samuel Hoare explained them in the House of Commons in moving language, with a dignity which did him honour and which compelled the admiration even of those who had judged us most harshly. He defended our common work. What will happen to-morrow ? We agrce that the Paris proposals are dead, but the way of con- ciliation remains open. The League Council has met. It has revived tlle Committee of Thirteen, who have resumed their task. Will the Com- mittee of Coordination, who, after having defined the niesures of economic pressure, must super- vise their application, enlarge the field of their activity ? Maiy I remind you that severe measures have already been taken in the financial and cconomic tields ? Who will maintain that they are ineffective ? And who can guarantee that they can be extended without any risk of extend- ilg the conflict ? Some say that what counts in their eyes is respect for international law. No doubt: but that law was framed to prevent war, to limit its effccts, and not to make it general. Sir Austen Chamberlain made this point with emphasis in the debate in the House of Commons when he said: It is essential, so long as sanc- tions designed to bring peace are in operation, that the League should never lose sight of the fact that sanctions are not an end in themselves but only a means of reaching it, and that if this end can be reached more quickly by negotiations -as must always be the case, in fact, for without negotiations the end can be reached only through the exhaustion of one party or the other-nego- tiations are not only allowed by the terms of the Covenant, but the Covenant makes it a duty to pursue them.” I am also asked whether I am not afraid that I may some day regret having limited the means which might be placed by other countries at the disposal of France to support her or protect her against a future aggression. That is the most serious reproach which is made to us. Is it well founded ? 1 am touching on a delicate subject. The League of Nations should, in theory, find its strength in its universal nature; in fact, it has never been fully universal and we
ought to remember the circumstances in which two great States, Germany and Japan, successively with- drew from that community. Their action made the execution of the task imposed on the institu- tion of Geneva niuch heavier. LIMITS OF POWER That is, of course, no reason why the principle of that universality should be contested, M. Laval continued. But, as a matter of immediate practice, the League of Nations would condemn itself to failure if it refused to recognize the limits of its powers. Indeed, it has never failed to do so; it has always proclaimed that means of application must be considered together with general obligations. It was at Geneva that the formula and method of pacts of regional assistance were conceived and devised. Is not their purpose precisely to organize in advance a systemn of mutual assist- ance limited to specially sensitive areas ? Failing agreements of this kind, the automatic applica- tion of Article XVI. of the Covenant will always remain uncertain and of limited scope. That is the fact. The action of the League in the present crisis has met and may again meet with difficulties without any proof that the principle of collective security is at fault. Our problem to-day is to ensure respect for international law by putting a stop to a conflict which is prejudicial to the interests of the com- munity of nations and which can be profitable only to the enemies of peace. Our problem is to spare Europe prolongation and aggravation of a crisis in which its already unstable equili- brium would run the risk of being irremediably disturbed. We must apply ourselves effectively to this task without damaging the principles of the League of Nations and without weakening at any point for the future the juridical basis of our mutual guiarantees. I lhave recalled the fatcts. I have outlined the principles. I have not betrayed any of our undertakings. If you reproach me with dis- agrcement with the British Government, I reply that bctween two great democracies frank argu- ments can only fortify the close collaboration which is essential to the protection of peace. No one can deny, and I less than anyone, that Franco-British cooperation is an essential element in the security of Europe. I have not failed in this cooperation. I have done no damage to the common bond between our countries, and I should not think, in reply to those who attack me, of reproaching Great Britain with having finally rejected proposals drawn up in Paris in collaboration with the British Secretary of State. I have taken action which I do not regret, because its purpose was to bring the conflict to an end. My determina- tion is not weakened because my action has not succeeded. Other attempts will have to be made which may have no more success. I must not be discouraged. I shall persevere, whatever happens, in fervent and tireless effort in favour of peace. OPPOSITION ATTACK M. Blum, who opened the case for the Opposition, somewhat tired the Chamber with the length of his speech, but made points which were applauded by a majority of Deputies. His speech was remarkable towards its end for a series of personal charges against M. Laval which exceeded the usual limits of debate and incensed a sttbstantial section of his audience. M. Blum accused M. Laval at once of practis- ing a personal policy, supported by that section of the Press wvhich he controlled. The only vestige of the policy of 10 days ago which Great Britain had repudiated was now M. Laval him- self. It was surprising to see him at this debate. He continued to threaten the country with a false alternative: his policy or war. M. Blum, for his part, and his fellow-Socialists, would always defend Republican liberties because they knew thait dictatorship meant war. A dictator- ship had made the present war and was persist- ing in it. Peace depended upon equal rights between nations and on their mutual support of one another. To-day a collective system was showing its power for the first time, but instead or rejoicing at this and at the attitudc of Great Britain the Government had shown sympathy for the aggressor and had given cause to suspect that they were unfaithful to the Covenant. Speaking after M. Blum, M. Taittinger, the leader of the Jeunesses Patriotes and a prominent member of the Right. said that France ought to remain neutral and need not choose between Great Britain and Itaiy. A more important speaker was M. Delbos, who, as chairman of the Socialist Radical group in the Chamber, held M. Laval’s fate to some extent in his hands. At their preliminary meeting this morning, the Socialist Radicals decided to retain their individual freedom to vote as they liked, and they approved their spokesmen in the debate, all of whom are against M. Laval. M. Deibos accord- ingly declared that M. Laval’s policy had failed and must be changed. Sanctions, in his opinion did not mean war. M9. Laval had forgotten that Geneva was the rallying point of Europe, and it was because he had left the path of Geneva that the Radicals would not give him their confidence. THE CHOICE FOR FRANCE In manv ways the most remarkable speech of the day. and one which mav have a decisive effect on the final vote, was that of M. Paul Reynaud, who assured the Chamber that the nation which France had to fear was not Italy but Germany, and that the nation whose support she needed most was Great Britain. Wlhat chance had Europe, M. Reynaud asked, of escaping war? The text-book of uerman youth was still Mein Kampf,” in wisich Herr Flitler said that Germany must ensure the neutrality oF Great Britain in order to have France at her mercy. The movement in favour of the League and of collective security in Great Britain was a godsend for France. It had been revealed by th& peace ballot before the Abyssinian tragedy began. That movement, which had just shown itself withi renewed force, meant that the problem of peace had been solved by the victory of a French idea. Unfortunately this was not understood. France had to choose to-day, M. Reynaud said, between Italy, who had broken the Covenant, and Great Britain, who was the guardian of the Covenant. Not only Italy but also Great Britain summoned her to make that choice. War would certainly come if France were separated from Great Britain. and it was not for Frenchmen when the voice of Britain cried, ” Stop the aggressor,” to reply, ” We will not march.” They had to choose between the forces represented by Great Britain and the Leaguic and by Italy, to which country they were no doubt tied by deep feelings, but which had made the mistake of believing that war remained the law of humanity. If it was a risk to denounce a mortal peril, Al. Reynaud was ready to accept that risk. M. Reynaud’s speech, which tipped the scales heavily against M. Laval, was re- ceived with a storm of applause by the Chamber, and shouts of “resign” were raised. The speech was the last importaht contribution to to-day’s debate. At 9.55 p.m. the Chamber adjourned until to-morrow. M. LAVAL HARD PRESSED REPLY TO HIS CRITICS THE PLEDGES TO BRITAIN CRITICAL DAY IN CHAMBER

The Times |  December 28, 1935

The Times | December 28, 1935

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